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Abstract
Based on the “street-level” and the “theory of the bureaucracy” approaches, 
the article contends that national bureaucracies may play an important role 
in explaining the relation between Brazilian foreign policy and international 
technical cooperation. Drawing lessons from a 2009 ENAP-ISAP project in 
Mozambique, we concluded that the Brazilian National School of Public 
Administration – ENAP’s interests and autonomy in the implementation process 
may influence Brazilian bilateral relations.
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Introduction
During the terms of the former Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006 and 2007-2010), the number of 
technical cooperation projects rose dramatically in comparison 
to previous periods. Available data for the 2005-2009 period 
demonstrates that while the total support Brazil provided for Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) reached almost R$3 billion, the 
total disbursement per year more than doubled when comparing 
the years of 2005 and 2009 (IPEA/ABC 2010, 19). In the case of 
the technical, scientific and technological cooperation, or simply 
“technical cooperation” (ABC 2013, 5), the total amount invested 
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increased more than three times during the same period, even though this modality of cooperation 
only represented a small fraction of the total amount invested in the Brazilian ODA.
As important as compiling the amount Brazil invested in ODA, the underlying reasons 
which allowed its exponential growth are more complex than a single statistical effort. At the 
system level, the financial crisis in central economies such as the U.S. and the European Union 
paved the way to the rapid increase of South-South investments and cooperation, both within 
IBSA and BRICS, or bilaterally. These conditions at the systemic level may have provided a 
fertile ground for promoting changes in the foreign policy strategies of emerging countries, such 
as China, India and Brazil.
Reaping the benefits of previous domestic structural adjustments and increased foreign 
investment, Brazil found itself in a situation of sustained economic growth, accumulated expertise 
in many public policy areas and redefined foreign policy strategies in the sense of South-South 
cooperation, in which Africa was a priority. Making use of an active diplomacy in the pursuit 
of its foreign policy goals, Brazilian technical cooperation projects were presented as a channel 
to provide expertise to Southern countries based on the human capital available in the Brazilian 
public service. As the former Brazilian Chancellor Celso Amorim frequently stated, technical 
cooperation was understood as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy carved by “solidarity” 
principles (Amorim 2010), which materialized the Brazilian willingness to increase its role in the 
provision of global public goods, differently from China and India. Notwithstanding, the official 
discourse of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) overshadows important aspects of the 
how technical cooperation relates to Brazilian foreign policy. The rhetoric of “solidarity diplomacy” 
assumes that public institutions (i.e. bureaucracies) of Brazilian public service would be willing to 
provide technical support for Southern countries solely based on the “solidarity” logic (Barbosa 
2012). However, the official discourse disregards the fact that bureaucrats are not neutral players 
in the policy process and that bureaucracies have their own institutional interests. Furthermore, 
even when bureaucracies decide to engage in international technical cooperation, the projects 
are commonly implemented by “street-level” bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010), who may influence the 
bilateral relations during the implementation process.
This article intends to examine the relations between foreign policy and Brazilian bilateral 
technical cooperation. If the bureaucracies control the provision of public goods during the 
implementation phase of technical cooperation projects, is it possible to assume that the declared 
foreign policy intentions define their behavior? This article states that the answer is negative 
and, therefore, Itamaraty should progressively bridge the gap between the official foreign policy 
discourse and the implementation of international technical cooperation projects. To do so, the 
impact of the Brazilian cooperation initiatives with recipient countries should be measured and 
incorporated to the policy process. As a null hypothesis, it stems from the idea propagated by 
Itamaraty that Brazilian foreign policy strategies define the nature of the technical cooperation 
projects (Schmitz 2010). As an alternative hypothesis, the article contends that bureaucratic 
interests and control over implementation are factors that may influence bilateral relations from 
the bottom up.
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Using Downs’ Theory of Bureaucracy and Lipsky’s concept of “street-level” bureaucracy, 
we support that the implementation phase of international cooperation projects must consider 
multiple actors and interests. To test the hypothesis, the article proposes a single case study, drawn 
from a bilateral technical cooperation project between Brazil and Mozambique. The project was 
implemented by the Brazilian National School of Public Administration (ENAP) in partnership with 
the Mozambican National Institute of Public Administration (ISAP) from 2009 (project design) to 
2012 (impact evaluation). The main reasons to choose this bilateral technical cooperation project 
are: (i) Mozambique and Brazil share strong historic identities (Saraiva 2001); (ii) Mozambique 
has massive business opportunities in which Chinese and Indian companies have been investing; 
(iv) Mozambique is a successful case among post-conflict countries (UNCTAD 2009).
The main objective of this article is to explore the relations between Brazilian foreign policy 
goals and bilateral technical cooperation projects, in the particular context of the single case study of 
the bilateral ENAP-ISAP project. To pursue this goal, Brazilian foreign policy strategy is compared 
to the Chinese and Indian cases, in order to show how different the three countries’ presence in 
Africa are (Harman and Brown 2013; Lechini 2012). The level of analysis then changes to the 
subnational, in order to discuss whether there is an analytical gap in the relation between foreign 
policy discourse and the role of Brazilian bureaucracies. Finally, the single case study is presented 
to test the null hypothesis. As final remarks, the article rejects the null hypothesis and contends 
that foreign policy strategies at the bilateral level must consider the interests of bureaucracies 
involved in the implementation of bilateral technical cooperation projects.
Three Foreign Policy Strategies for Africa in the New Millennium
The situation of Africa in the 2000s was radically different from the 90s, when analysts massively 
publicized a never-ending list of “failures” of African societies. Africa was the fastest-growing 
regional economy on earth during the period 2000-2009 and it is also the host region of eleven 
of the fastest-growing countries according to the World Economic Outlook of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Based on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) data, 
Africa displayed an average growth above 6% between 2005-2008, and projects an average of 5% 
for 2011-2013 (Mayaki 2009). In addition, and following a global trend, the incidence of conflicts 
in the African continent has decreased considerably, undermining the traditional military-based 
definitions of security in favor of a multifaceted understanding of “threat” and “insecurity” by 
introducing elements of material inequality, justice and citizenship (World Bank 2011).
The indicators would easily lead to optimistic scenarios about the future performance of the 
African economies. Analysts usually highlight the fast urbanization process, the emerging urban 
middle classes and the abundance of commodities as the main reasons why Africa may be seen as 
the golden investment opportunity in terms of return rates (Dorr 2011). For them, Africa represents 
the last frontier for the global capitalist system. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to understand the 
presence and the goals of both China and India in the African continent. 
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Reporting in the late 2007, the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
remarked that Asia had recently become a significant source of FDI in Africa. The reason the 
Commission pointed out the small FDI growth from Asia in comparison to other regions was 
that African markets were small and their development level were generally low. In addition, the 
Commission discussed the effects of high transaction costs associated with low knowledge of the 
local markets, poor regulatory framework and also that Asian companies are usually looking for 
knowledge-intensive labor force (UNCTAD 2007). What has changed since then?
The 2008 economic crisis had different impacts throughout the world. Emerging countries 
like China, India and Brazil stimulated the appetite of their local consumer markets through 
state-oriented policies with considerable degree of success. Africa, in its turn, benefited both 
from the quick economic measures adopted by the Chinese and Indian governments and also 
from new financial flows from the Arab Gulf, which helped maintaining the level of investments 
in infrastructure projects guided by NEPAD strategy (UNCTAD 2007). Considering that North 
American interest in Africa has remained stable from the end of the Cold War until the late 
2000s, and that the investment capacity of traditional partners from Europe slightly declined 
after the 2008 crisis, considerable room was made for Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments 
(AfDB/OECD/UNDP/UNECA 2011).
China and India
There seems to be a consensus among analysts that Chinese goals in Africa were related 
to a safe supply of minerals, energy and other commodities for maintaining the sustainability 
of its economic growth. To a lesser extent, the Chinese marginally sought to develop local 
consumer markets as “safe havens” for the occasional surpluses of Chinese manufactured products 
(UNCTAD 2007; Broadman 2008; Lechini 2012; Harman and Brown 2013). Recent trends in the 
Chinese-African political and economic relations during the 2000s support this general perception.
Although the Chinese FDI in Africa dates back to the 80s, it was not until 2000 that 
Chinese interests grew bigger and an official cooperation strategy with the African Continent was 
formalized. The Chinese strategy is based on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
officially established as a coordination mechanism for reaching consensus, cooperation and equal 
participation among China and fifty African States. But the two major agenda items of the 1st 
Ministerial Conference poses questions that go much further than merely trade and political 
understanding: “1. In what way should we work towards the establishment of a new international 
political and economic order in the 21st century? 2. How should we further strengthen Sino-African 
economic cooperation and trade under the new circumstances?”1. The Ministerial Conferences 
are held every three years and are attended by the Foreign Ministers of each country as well as 
the ministers-in-charge of economic cooperation. Senior Official preparatory meetings precede 
the Ministerial Conferences in a few days and are usually attended by director-level official of 
1 http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157578.htm. Accessed June 23, 2016.
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competent departments of government2. Follow-up meetings take place every year in China and also 
a year before each Ministerial Meeting, when senior officials of each country discuss the status of 
cooperation. Finally, the 3rd Ministerial Conference held in 2006 decided to establish an additional 
mechanism for political consultation between the parties, gathering foreign ministers in New York 
every year after the Ministerial Conferences, during the United Nations General Assembly.3
In the period of 2000-2012, five Ministerial Meetings took place and four Action Plans were 
put forward to strengthen Africa-China relations. Actions were concentrated in strategic areas such 
as human resources training, export credit lines, preferential loans and preferential export-buyer’s 
credit, promotion of local development projects financed by Chinese-African Development Funds, 
agriculture, local stimulus for scientific and technological development, provision of scholarships, 
and deployment of Chinese physicians. Recent data released by the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) confirmed that the Chinese cooperation efforts were effectively translated into economic 
results: the share of Chinese trade with Africa grew from 4.7% in 2000 to 13.9% in 2009. 
Chinese trade with Africa represented nearly 40% of the total African trade between Africa and 
its Emerging Partners in 2009, while the Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented 
25% of the total assistance of Emerging Partners to Africa in the same year.4
Generally speaking, India had goals similar to China, being the access to African markets its 
ultimate priority. Even though India has been tailoring a similar strategy in regards to the creation 
of a coordination body for its relations with African countries – the India-Africa Forum – there 
are sound differences in that which concerns the internationalization of Indian businesses in 
comparison to the Chinese strategy. Firstly, African-Indian relations have historical roots, dating 
back to the commerce between the territories during the British colonial occupation. Secondly, 
nearly 10% of the “Indian Diaspora” had Africa as a destination.
Finally, even though the Indian State has a role in the internationalization and investment 
efforts, the bulk of transactions is business-driven.5 Indian efforts in Africa seem to be linked to 
the economic rationale of expansion to guarantee sustained growth and also to the raising fears 
associated to the current expansion of investments promoted by China in Africa. Differently from 
China, the expansion to Africa is not linked to a grand and unified State-led strategy (Taylor 2013). 
The India-Africa forum comprises several areas of cooperation. While China covers a vast array 
of issue areas, India cooperation is strongly directed towards technical assistance and capacity-
building, especially in the fields of education, training, and technological support. Another sound 
difference from China is the fact that Indian projects are directly funded instead of adopting a 
Chinese model of grant supply. Since China is usually seen in Africa as an aggressive state-led 
investor and trader, India tried to show a different face, and so did Brazil, notably in the words 
of former President Lula6.
2 http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/t933522.htm. Accessed June 23, 2016.
3 http://www.focacsummit.org/. Accessed June 23, 2016.
4 http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157578.htm. Accessed June 23, 2016.
5 http://www. indiaafricainvest.in/ and http://www.ficci.com/. Both accessed June 23, 2016.
6 "Lula defende investimento brasileiro na África durante seminário em Brasília". Instituto Lula, 2013. http://www.institutolula.org/
lula-encerra-seminario-sobre-relacoes-brasil-africa/. Accessed June 23, 2016.
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Brazil
The most remarkable traits of Brazilian foreign policy seem to be continuity and stability 
(Saraiva 2003), which are usually focused on historic and organizational considerations (Cervo and 
Bueno 2008), emphasizing: (i) the normative-idealist character of foreign policy discourse and the 
projection of a Brazilian “image” in the international system (Lafer 2009); (ii) the relation between 
the consolidated bureaucracy represented by the Itamaraty and the stability of the foreign policy 
goals in the long run (Cheibub 1985, 1989). In what concerns the Brazilian foreign policy and 
the Brazil-Africa relations during the terms of President Lula, one additional debate is imperative: 
the role of new subnational public and private actors in both the formulation/implementation 
of foreign policy as well as their influence on the relations with foreign countries (Figueira 2010; 
Faria 2012; Milani, 2014).
In Brazil, the arguments on the uniqueness of foreign policy vis-à-vis other public policies 
are essentially rooted in assumptions about the self-help character of state relations (Lima 2000). 
According to such arguments, only centralization and vertical control over foreign policy formulation/
practice in the domestic system would guarantee the necessary coherence in external affairs. 
The argument holds less true, however, with assumptions due to the decentralized character of 
decision-making processes in democracies. These assumptions are based on a Realist epistemology 
of the unitary-state that fails to capture that the foreign policy formulation/implementation in 
democracies is also a direct result of the domestic political struggles (Cardoso 2010). In other 
words, although the Brazilian foreign policy is considered to be centralized in Itamaraty, there 
are emerging bureaucratic powers in the implementation of technical cooperation projects that 
play a key role in South-South cooperation.
During the 2003-2010 period, Itamaraty promoted the idea that “In a democracy, foreign 
policy is one amidst a number of foreign policies. It ought to be subject to the scrutiny of public 
opinion and be mindful of people’s will as expressed at the ballot box”(Amorim 2010, 214-215). 
Such understanding is paramount for framing the processes pertaining to the Brazilian-African 
relations during the this period, once it permits an interplay of three political instances: (i) the 
economic rise of Africa; (ii) Brazilian Foreign Policy to Africa and the role of President Lula da 
Silva in promoting the relations with Africa; (iii) the emergence of new actors from different 
public policies areas in the formulation/implementation in foreign policy, especially regarding 
the relation between the foreign policy and technical cooperation. Since the first issue has already 
been discussed, the analysis will focus on Lula’s foreign policy for Africa and its impacts. The 
third issue will be discussed thoroughly in the following session.
Brazilian foreign policy is generally known for its focus on consensus and for advancing 
ideas and proposals that may lead to a transformation “from within” the international order. 
As the former Chancellor Celso Amorim stated more than once, Brazil is in a permanent struggle 
to promote democratic values and reduce the inequality among states in international order 
(Amorim 2011). In this vein, some analysts emphasize that multilateralism is a historic pillar of 
Brazilian foreign policy (Fonseca 2011). On the other hand, others stress that Brazilian preference 
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for multilateralism is in fact a strategy of articulating the norms and principles that constitute 
the international structure/order to promote the national interest without relying on force or 
threats, known as “consensual hegemony” (Burges 2008). Although the interpretations on the use 
of the discourse to accomplish foreign policy goals vary, Itamaraty seems to promote an image 
of a “negotiating power” and “consensus-builder”. As an analyst has recently remarked, Brazil 
intends to be seen as “(…) the ultimate soft-power power” (Glasser 2010). In sum, Brazilian 
strategy towards Africa during President Lula terms was purposely diverse from the Chinese and 
Indian ones.
The image Brazil projected to the world mattered for its relations with Africa. The Lula 
administration promoted the idea that Brazil-Africa relations should be based both on historic/
cultural grounds and on shared economic-political interests (Amorim 2011, 180). In fact, and 
from a historical point of view, Africa had a constitutive role in the Brazilian society. Far from 
being a relation based on material grounds, Brazil has a huge cultural identity with African 
societies. Alternatively, Africa also had a special place in Lula’s foreign policy, once it was seen as 
a destination for Brazilian businesses and also an important source of support at the multilateral 
level (Saraiva 2010, 169-182).
When promoting the new Atlantic Strategy between Brazil and Africa, President Lula was 
a key player. The President made twelve official missions to Africa, having visited twenty-three 
African countries. As a result of the direct involvement of Lula promoting relations with Africa, 
the then Brazilian Chancellor made sixty-seven official visits to Africa in thirty-four different 
African countries. In addition, by the end of 2011, Brazil had diplomatic staff in thirty-seven of 
the fifty-four African countries (World Bank and IPEA 2011, 40-43).
In a broader sense, Brazil intended to promote an image that linked its own fate to the 
well-being of the community of States, in a “(…) dialectic relation between national interest 
and the exercise of solidarity” (Amorim 2011, 225). Technical cooperation was responsible for 
building bridges that helped reducing inequalities among states and progressively endorsed the 
idea of changing the order “from within”. In other words, it was considered to be an instrument 
that materialized the Brazilian contribution to the provision of global public goods. Therefore, 
Brazilian cooperation with Africa was strongly focused on building capacity and sharing expertise 
to develop local government capacity. The strategy for Africa was known as a reformulated version 
of the old “Atlantismo”, one in which horizontal relations and enduring partnerships were the key 
ingredients (Schleicher 2015).
Less understood, however, are the inter-bureaucratic dynamics that arose during the design 
and implementation of technical cooperation projects and their relation to the foreign policy goals 
(Inoue and Vaz 2012, 528). As Hirst noted, “Brazil understands the CSS [South-South Cooperation] 
as an institutional act of providing public goods from its agencies and state organizations”(2012, 
10). If international cooperation is an instrument of foreign policy and the former, in its turn, 
depends on the provision of public goods deriving from other national public policy issue-areas, 
it seems logical to conclude that bureaucratic politics also play an important role in explaining 
Brazilian foreign policy process. To some extent, a recent analysis on the presence of Brazil in 
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Haiti, Guinea and Bolivia discusses such an idea when pointing out that the more consolidated a 
public policy issue-area is, the more it helps projecting Brazil internationally through international 
cooperation initiatives ”(Hirst 2012, 12).
Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy: Lessons from the ENAP-ISAP 
South-South Technical Cooperation Project
Bureaucracies, bureaucrats, and the role of implementation
For Weber, “bureaucracy” is an ideal-type organization based on assumptions of rationality 
and legality (1999). His model predicted that the “bureaucracy” would demand a strict system of 
rules and processes to assure a well-defined chain of command, a high degree of impersonality, and 
the division of labor focused on efficiency and individual expertise. Based on that, Weber was able 
to discuss the fundamental social implications and the organizational dysfunctions associated to 
the model, such as the inability to promote change, the incidence of corruption, and the excessive 
focus on expert advice in relation to societal demands.
The Weberian logic, however, assumes that bureaucrats would behave according to the 
prescribed norms and rules. Anthony Downs (1965, 439-446) challenges this assumption by 
advancing the idea that at least part of the time bureaucrats would be motivated by their own 
self-interest during the decision-making processes. In other words, bureaucrats are not simply 
individuals who work for bureaus, but rational and utility maximizing agents who pursue a complex 
set of personal and organizations goals. Bureaucrats could be defined as individuals who work for 
a large organization; whose personal income fundamentally comes from the organization; whose 
promotion/retention is based on performance and individual expertise; who produce results that 
cannot be exclusively measured by market-based metrics.
Concerning the underlying interests that drive the individual behavior, Downs prescribes 
that bureaucrats would fall into five distinct groups: (i) “Climbers”, who seek power, income and 
prestige for personal purposes; (ii) “Conservers”, who seek to maintain their own convenience 
and security by supporting status quo alternatives; (iii) “Zealots”, whose loyalty is restricted to a 
particular policy or an underlying concept that drives a policy; (iv) “Advocates”, who are loyal to 
a set of policies and/or to an organization. Advocates tend to support their organization or part 
of the organization at all costs in conflicts with “outsiders”; (v)“Statesmen”, whose loyalty lie in 
the greater good and the society well-being as a whole. Even though bureaucrats are self-interested 
actors, neither their interests nor the organizational goals can be analyzed without taking into 
account the conditions and characteristics of the external environment (Downs 1965).
In a pure rational-maximization model, the assumptions of perfect information and high 
capacity of each actor to process the data, rank the options, and chose the one that maximizes the 
utility are frequently used (Downs 1965). However, in real-world decision environments where 
actors operate, no such open access to information exists (March 1994). In addition, actors usually 
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have limited time and capacity to make decisions. Consequently, alternative decision models were 
developed to explain how past experiences and incremental changes provide a viable option for 
choice among bureaucrats or how bureaucrats estimate and decide to take risks associated with 
organizational choices (Lindblom 1959, 79-88).
Aside from the assumptions of rationality and maximization, there is a particular problem 
in the discussion of the Weberian ideal-type and the model proposed by Downs: they both 
disregard the fact that bureaucrats may have different interests and behavior depending on their 
position inside the bureaucracy. Weber assumes that the rational rule-based system provides the 
necessary legitimacy for the hierarchic differentiation inside the bureaucracy, given that the rules 
provide a system based on merit and individual performance. Downs assumes that his heuristic 
exercise to segregate bureaucrats according to their interests would apply to any bureaucrat, 
regardless of his/her position in the organizational structure. To bridge the gap, Michael Lipsky 
(2010) proposes an insightful duality between managers (high level bureaucrats) and technicians 
(street-level bureaucrats).
Lipsky defines a “street-level” bureaucrat as a civil servant who interacts directly with the 
citizen and who has a considerable discretion and room to maneuver during the implementation 
of a policy. The discretion enjoyed by street-level bureaucrats mainly arises as a mechanism to cope 
with constraints related to time, as well as the lack of information and resources to implement the 
policy. Such bureaucrats typically develop specific and innovative routines to deal with the demands 
and expectations related to the public service provision. Furthermore, they usually prioritize the 
implementation of some aspects of a policy over others, creating a paradox of discretion inside 
the authoritative rule-based structure that defines the very idea of “bureaucracy”.
The “street-level” bureaucracy idea modifies the decision environment in at least two ways. 
First, as those bureaucrats develop new routines and protocols to cope with uncertainties, such 
mechanisms effectively become the essence of the policy that is being implemented. Secondly, 
aside from the traditional inter-bureaucratic politics that may emerge from the different individual 
interests discussed by Downs, the struggle between high-level (managers) and street-level (technicians) 
become an important and integral part of the policy-making process. In other words, street-level 
bureaucrats have a relative autonomy from the organizational authority while enjoying a high 
degree of discretion and control over policy implementation.
Case Study: the ENAP-ISAP Technical Cooperation Project
From the standpoint of the Foreign Policy decision-making, the technical cooperation is 
promoted as a tool to pursue Brazilian foreign policy goals in a given country and, systemically, as 
an incarnation of Brazilian contribution to the global provision of public goods. Brazilian technical 
cooperation has a particular focus on capacity-building, implying that the mobilization and 
development of local resources are the main goals of any Technical Cooperation Project (Agência 
Brasileira de Cooperação 2010, 5-8). To achieve such goals, Brazilian technical cooperation initiatives 
What is the relation between Brazilian Foreign Policy and the implementation of bilateral technical cooperation [...]
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 60(1): e002, 2017 Schleicher, Platiau  
10
usually presume that the initial demand comes directly from the interested party and the relations 
between Brazil and the beneficiary country will be based on a true partnership. It is important to 
stress that, differently from the traditional ODA based on grants and/or pure knowledge transfer 
by “experts”, Brazilian capacity-building approach to bilateral technical cooperation implies an 
active and horizontal dialogue between partners, which may also eventually lead to mutual learning.
It is important to note that the ABC does not possess the resources to implement technical 
cooperation projects. Even though the ABC is the institution inside Itamaraty responsible to 
supervise official technical cooperation projects, the Agency usually makes use of human resources 
from other Brazilian organizations to implement them. During Lula’s terms, many Brazilian federal 
bureaucracies received requests from the ABC to design and implement technical cooperation 
projects, particularly in developing countries (South-South cooperation). In doing so, the ABC 
frequently mobilized the available human resources from Brazilian federal civil servants (high-rank 
and street-level bureaucrats) to materialize the demand from developing countries. In the case 
study under scrutiny in this article, the Brazilian National School of Public Administration 
(ENAP) and its human resources were the most important actors involved in implementation 
from the Brazilian side.
ENAP as a Bureaucracy
The Brazilian National School of Public Administration (ENAP) was officially created in 
1990.7 Bill 8140/90 defined its organization mission as “developing continued education and 
capacity building of public servants from the Brazilian Federal Public Administration”. In addition, 
Bill 8140/90 determined that ENAP was be responsible for coordinating and supervising all 
continued education programs for all federal civil servants of the Brazilian federal administration, 
since ENAP was not the only bureaucracy inside the Brazilian federal government that provided 
capacity building courses and continued education programs for federal civil servants.
Bill 8140/90 was later regulated by the Decree 6563 of 2008, which approved ENAP’s statute 
and its organizational structure.8 ENAP’s organizational mission was reinstated by the decree 
as “promoting, designing and implementing capacity building programs for the Federal Public 
Administration, aiming at increasing the government capacity to manage public policies”. The 
decree also determined six major business processes: (i) designing and implementing managerial 
development programs for the public administration; (ii) coordinating and supervising the managerial 
development programs for public civil servants implemented by other schools of government of 
the federal public administration; (iii) design and implement initial training programs for public 
service careers and permanent capacity-building programs for public agents; (iv) promote, explore 
and disseminate knowledge on public management, making ample use of research activities, public 
7 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/1989_1994/L8140.htm. Accessed June 23, 2016.
8 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6563.htm. Retrieved on June 23, 2016.
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events, editorial activities and national and international exchange programs; (v) provide technical 
assistance to the design of strategies and projects whose goal is the development, training, capacity 
building, and continued education of managers and public servants; (vi) define and implement 
the system of schools of government of the Union.
ENAP’s organizational structure was strictly related to its business processes. The president 
of ENAP was directly supported by its cabinet, the international advisors’ office, the attorney’s 
office and the internal audit office. Directly under the president’s authority, there were four 
directors: (i) internal management; (ii) professional education; (iii) managerial development; 
(iv) communication and research. The major decision-making instance of ENAP was the board 
of directors, composed by the president and his four directors, all with voting powers.
As a public foundation regulated by Brazilian public law, the permanent staff of the School 
is mainly composed by career c servants. In 2008, there were 169 career public servants at ENAP 
representing 84% of the total workforce.9 According to the Brazilian 1988 Federal Constitution 
and Bill 8112/90, the hiring process for any public post is based on competitive exams. During 
the Lula administration, ENAP organized two public contests to fill approximately eighty-five 
permanent posts for the career named “educational affairs technician”, in 2006 and in 2009.10 
When the project with Mozambique was finalized, in 2012, the workforce at the School was 
composed of 288 individuals, all of them civil servants.11
Recalling Downs’ four criteria to define a bureaucracy and bureaucrats, ENAP seems to be 
a good fit. It is a large institution whose majority of members are full-time workers. In addition, 
the hiring and retention of its employees are based exclusively on merit. Finally, the impact and 
results of ENAP’s main product – capacity building and educational courses – cannot be measured 
in terms of profit. In addition, unlike many bureaucracies of the Brazilian federal public service, 
ENAP’s services are directly provided to its client, the public servants and agents.
The Environment of the ENAP-ISAP Technical Cooperation
International cooperation was an important instrument to support the ENAP mission, 
considering that the ENAP itself was inspired by a foreign benchmark among the Schools of 
Government, the French École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). Since its creation, ENAP 
has been a recipient of international cooperation projects from several traditional donors. The 
international cooperation agreement with the Canadian School of Government, for example, 
resulted in considerable improvement of courses related to leadership.12 A second example of 
ENAP’s international cooperation was the development of a training course for practitioners of 
9 http://www.enap.gov.br/documents/586024/601745/2009__Relatorio_Gestao.pdf/0e977112-4e0c-4b2d-80eb-afbfce929d09. 
Accessed June 23, 2016.
10 Portaria MP nº 256/2005 and Portaria MP nº 27/2009.
11 http://www.enap.gov.br/documents/586024/601745/2012__Relatorio_Gestao.pdf/aeccc52c-c93a-4008-8e33-a28503dbc6d4. 
Accessed June 23, 2016.
12 http://www.enap.gov.br/web/pt-br/desenvolvimento-tecnico-e-gerencial. Accessed June 22, 2016.
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international cooperation from the Federal Government, a partnership among ENAP, the German 
Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ, in German) and the ABC.13
Furthermore, like many other public entities, through the years ENAP accumulated considerable 
organizational knowledge and best practices. During the Brazilian reform of the public sector, conducted 
by Minister Luis Bresser Pereira, under president Fernando Henrique Cardoso first and second 
terms (1995-1998 and 1999-2002), professional training became a strategy for disseminating the 
reform’s objectives and priorities among public civil servants (Pereira 1998, Pereira and Spink 
1998). During President Lula’s two terms, ENAP also grew in importance with the Labor’s Party 
demands for developing leadership training in the public sector. In addition, during Lula’s terms, 
ENAP made a considerable effort to coordinate the capacity-building initiatives among the 
thirteen federal schools of government and also to manage the dense network of all schools of 
government from the Federal, State and local governments in Brazil.14 Notwithstanding, and like 
many bureaucracies, the ENAP mission did not envision the direct assistance to foreign countries. 
As stated in the Decree 6563/08, the primary aim of ENAP’s international cooperation activities was 
to increase its own capacity to implement its organizational mission for Brazilian public servants. 
As discussed before, Lula’s administration assumed that South-South technical cooperation 
would be defined by the Brazilian foreign policy strategies. This assumption, though, was not 
automatic at the “street-level” of technical cooperation. In fact, many bureaucracies of the Brazilian 
federal public service had to restructure their business processes and regular activities and in order to 
cope with the requests of the ABC and the demands from international partners. In the current case 
study, managers at ENAP saw the project with Mozambique as an opportunity to internationalize 
the School, by testing its educational strategies in different cultural environments, receiving students 
from foreign countries, and offering mixed-class courses with Brazilian and foreign students. After 
the project with Mozambique was successfully finalized, it came with no surprise that ENAP decided 
to revise the Decree 6563/08 and include international cooperation as one of its business processes 
“VI – Develop and manage national and international cooperation projects”.15
Implementation and the role of ENAP
The Technical Cooperation Project between ENAP and ISAP is the result of a long negotiation 
process that can be traced back to September 19, 1981, when Brazil and Mozambique signed 
a Framework Agreement for the Technical Cooperation. In 2003, representatives from both 
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the field of Public Administration 
in Maputo. It was only in May 2009, that the Brazilian and the Mozambican Government were 
able to define a particular scope for the technical cooperation on public administration discussed 
13 http://www.enap.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1599&Itemid=298. Accessed June 22, 2016.
14 http://www2.enap.gov.br/rede_escolas/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1. Accessed June 22, 2016.
15 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2013/Decreto/D8091.htm#art2. Accessed June 22, 2016.
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in the MoU. The 2009 “Executive Program” between Brazil and Mozambique was named “Support 
to the Strategic Managerial Development of the Mozambican Government”.
In its Article I, the Executive Program envisioned a technical cooperation based on two 
main objectives: (i) promoting capacity-building events for employees and agents of the public 
administration of Mozambique, in order to optimize the implementation of public policies and 
resources; (ii) promoting the exchange of publications or any other activity that strengthens 
institutions involved in the field of public management.16 Curiously, even though the Executive 
Program provides a narrow scope for a technical cooperation project, it silences about the role 
of evaluation. Although it defines that such a project should have clear objectives, activities and 
results (Art. II), there is no single word about how (or if ) objectives, activities or results should 
be evaluated. In fact, the underlying logic of Article IV provisions is that only activities should be 
monitored by the four parties involved. In other words, parties should monitor the activities to 
assure the delivery of educational services, but not how the services impacted in the organizations 
involved or in the relations with the recipient country, in a broader sense.
As soon as the Executive Program was signed, the ABC invited ENAP to join a mission 
to Mozambique (Fax ABC/251, May 14, 2009) and ENAP recommended three specialists from 
the School (Ofício n. 251/2009/Presidência-ENAP, May 18, 2009). The mission was designed to 
evaluate if the information technology infrastructure in Maputo could support the demand of 
on-line courses offered by ENAP and the physical structure to support other face-to-face courses 
and workshops. The mission took place from June 8 to 14, 2009, and resulted in a draft proposal 
focused on five results: (i) developing leaders; (ii) strengthening the organizational capacity to 
produce and manage organizational knowledge; (iii) supporting public institutions to develop 
their training programs; (iv) support the Mozambican system for training and development of 
public servants (SIFAPA), which comprised ISAP (training for high-rank bureaucrats) and the 
Institutos de Formação em Adminisração Pública e Autárquica – IFAPAs (training for low-rank 
and street-level level bureaucrats); (v) increase the number of on-line courses.
The resulting Technical Cooperation Project was signed with delay on April 14, 2010, 
with an estimated budget of US$ 930,478.05 and a time frame of 18 months. Among the five 
expected results from the first draft, the project focused on four results: (i) High and low rank 
public servants attended courses on leadership, team management, project management and 
strategic planning; (ii) SIFAPA managers trained on leadership, planning and strategic/systems 
approach; (iii) SIFAPA teams trained to design and implement courses aligned to the development 
of professional competencies in public administration; (iv) publications sent to Mozambique. 
The final outcomes for each planned activity are displayed on Table 1 below.
16 http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2009/b_6333/. Accessed June 22, 2016.
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Table  1 – Outcomes of Project  
“Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Gerencial Estratégico do Governo de Moçambique”
ACTIVITIES Outcome Goal Performance Enrollment Dropouts Dropouts rate
Goal – Train 293 directors, managers, supervisors and technicians of the 
Mozambican government in the fields of leadership, team management, project 
management and strategic planning
165 293 56,31% 174 9 5,17%
Activity 1.1: COURSE: LIDERANÇA: REFLEXÃO E AÇÃO 28 30 93,33% 28 0 0,00%
Activity 1.2: COURSE:  PAPEL DO GERENTE NA GESTÃO DO DESEMPENHO DE EQUIPES cancelled 120 0,00% 0 0 0,00%
Activity 1.3: COURSE: ELABORAÇÃO E GERENCIAMENTO DE PROJETOS 29 30 96,67% 38 9 23,68%
Activity 1.4: COURSE:   PLANEJAMENTO ESTRATÉGICO NO SERVIÇO PÚBLICO 58 48 120,83% 58 0 0,00%
Activity 1.5: WORKSHOP: DESENVOLVIMENTO DE EQUIPES 45 60 75,00% 45 0 0,00%
Activity 1.6: COURSE: LIDERANÇA: REFLEXÃO e AÇÃO 5 5 100,00% 5 0 0,00%
Goal 2 – Train SIFAPA management teams in the fields of leadership, planning and 
strategic/systems approach 17 20 85,00% 24 7 29,17%
2.1: WORKSHOP: ALINHAMENTO ESTRATÉGICO 17 20 85,00% 24 7 29,17%
Goal 3 – Train 100 educators to design and implement courses aligned to the 
development of professional competencies in public administration 90 100 90,00% 111 21 18,92%
Activity 3.1: MISSION TO ENAP 10 10 100,00% 10 0 0,00%
Activity 3.2: COURSE: DESENHO INSTRUCIONAL 26 30 86,67% 32 6 18,75%
Activity 3.3: COURSE: DIDÁTICA PARA FACILITADORES 54 60 90,00% 69 15 21,74%
TOTAL 272 413 65,86% 309 37 11,97%
Source: DDG/ENAP. Final Report of Project “Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Gerencial Estratégico do Governo de Moçambique”. December 15, 2011.
Coming back to the central argument of this article, why did ENAP decide to participate 
in a project with complex logistics of implementation, high costs and that officially involved four 
organizations from two countries? Should one accept the assumption that any resource of the 
Brazilian public institution is available for the implementation of a South-South Cooperation 
project just for the sake that this modality of cooperation presumes “solidarity”?
In fact, and supported by several documents provided by the School, the main interest of 
ENAP was not primarily the provision of services based on the idea of “solidarity”. As discussed 
before, ENAP accumulated considerable knowledge from its past experiences with Brazilian public 
service and international cooperation projects. From the standpoint of the organization, ENAP 
was interested in expanding its activities and gaining new knowledge that increased the quality 
of its services. In other words, it was focused on internationalization opportunities as many other 
Brazilian bureaucracies, like the Embrapa and the federal universities.
A central document in such a discussion is the 2010 “Projeto Básico” (Framework Project) for 
the Technical Cooperation Project. In short, it is a document required by Brazilian Bill 8666/93 
that states all the elements related to the provision of public services and goods that may result in 
the disbursement of public funds. In the case of the project with Mozambique, the “Projeto Básico” 
clearly tries to bridge the gap between the solidarity component of the technical cooperation and 
the institutional interest based on the organizational mission defined by the Decree 6563/08, 
when it concludes that
It remains evident that the implementation of the planned activities will contribute to 
the institutional growth of the public administration of Mozambique, but the School 
is also aware that the implementation of the project will benefit the administration of 
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the international technical cooperation policy of the Federal Government, promoting, 
designing and implementing capacity building courses for public servants, according 
to its Statute.
Using Downs’ typology, there were also two strong “advocates” for the project inside ENAP, 
the international advisor of the School and the director of managerial development (who was 
also the project manager of the Technical Cooperation Project). Both actors worked to promote 
the idea that the project was aligned to the organizational mission and interests. In fact, they 
were important actors when ENAP decided to propose to the ABC an impact evaluation for the 
project. Although the project did not anticipate any impact evaluation on the institutions and 
relations with Mozambique, ENAP was strongly interested in assessing the degree of success of its 
educational strategies and the organizational learning results. Also, the ENAP was eager to extend 
the project to a second phase, while the ABC was interested in developing alternative models to 
evaluate South-South cooperation projects.
In this sense, ENAP proposed to restructure the project and build an ex-post impact evaluation 
matrix in a two-step process. The first was a workshop in March 2012, when participants from 
the ENAP and the ABC developed a logical framework for the project, an impact evaluation 
matrix and the questionnaires to be applied on-line and face-to-face to individuals involved in 
the project from all levels (students, managers, technicians, etc). The second step was a mission 
to Mozambique in April 2012, in order to conduct twenty-four face-to-face interviews based on 
the questionnaires.
As expected by ENAP, the final report of the impact evaluation released in June 2012 revealed 
the high performance of the indicators for each objective defined in the logical framework matrix.17 
ENAP used a qualitative method of research based on the idea of “waves of impact”, which 
intended to identify the reach and depth of change from of the actions from the individual to the 
broader goals of the Government of Mozambique. ENAP’s methodology and impact evaluation 
had a positive impact on other South-South cooperation projects, such as Embrapa’s Cotton-4 
Project (Suyama and Rigout, not dated), and also as an additional source of information to the 
ABC’s “Manual de Gestão de Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul”, issued in 2013. Finally, the bilateral 
relations were clearly influenced by the success of the project, given the willingness of all partners 
to continue the cooperation (ENAP 2012, 7-8).
Conclusion
Two lessons can be drawn for the relations between Brazilian foreign policy and the technical 
cooperation with Africa. Firstly, and rejecting the null hypothesis, the bilateral technical cooperation 
projects are more than instruments of the Brazilian foreign policy under Itamaraty’s control. The 
implementation process is composed by complex interests which arise from bureaucratic processes, 
17 http://repositorio.enap.gov.br/handle/1/826. Accessed June 22, 2016.
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although in the case of the ENAP-ISAP project only the bureaucratic process in Brazil was assessed. 
From the Brazilian perspective, there is a strong diplomatic and presidential effort that leads to the 
perception of a technical cooperation centralized by Itamaraty, but the analysis of the implementation 
process of the case study demonstrated that ENAP had its own interests and considerable room 
to maneuver from the very beginning. This conclusion is compatible with literature about the 
role bureaucracies may play on the foreign policy processes, which is still underexplored in Brazil. 
In addition, it seems that the discourse based on the Southern “solidarity” may have been used 
mostly to differentiate the Brazilian strategy from the Chinese and Indian cases.
Secondly, the alternative hypothesis, that bureaucracies may have an important impact in 
influencing the bilateral relations with foreign countries, was verified. Notwithstanding, from an 
International Relations theoretical point of view and from the analysis of the Brazilian official 
discourse, the roles of bureaucrats and the street-level bureaucracy remain invisible. In addition to 
the key role ENAP played in this South-South cooperation project, the interests of bureaucrats as 
“advocates” to the project and the role of street-level bureaucrats – who effectively implemented 
and assessed the impacts of the project – confirm the ideas proposed by Downs and Lipsky. 
As a consequence, in the ENAP case, the relation between Brazilian foreign policy and the 
implementation of the technical cooperation project supposes specific interests from participating 
bureaucracies and a significant degree of autonomy for them. This conclusion remains to be tested 
in other similar cases.
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